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NOTES
pointed out that even if the defendant did not intend to make an
offer in the advertisement, it is to be noted that "there is entirely
too much disregard of law and truth in the business, social, and
political world to-day. It is time to hold men to their primary
engagements to tell the truth and observe the law of common
honesty and fair dealing. '1 8 The instant case may indicate the
court's attitude toward misleading advertisements currently
being used in the conduct of many businesses. It would appear
that in future cases involving advertisements to buy or sell mer-
chandise, even when the import of the advertisement is ambigu-
ous or tending to mislead, the social desirability of promoting
fair business practices will prompt the court to find that an offer
has been made.19 It should be noted that when such an advertise-
ment is ambiguous, or tends to mislead, a contrary result would
be reached at common law.20 The Court of Appeal for the First
Circuit is apparently taking a realistic attitude toward curbing
business practices which are not in good faith. It is submitted
that the court's position is a desirable one.
Thomas A. Warner, Jr.
CRIMINAL LAW- GUILTY KNOWLEDGE AS AN ELEMENT OF
UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS
Defendant was convicted of the crime of unlawful possession
of narcotics.' Over defendant's objections, the trial judge ad-
mitted evidence of a subsequent offense as tending to prove
guilty knowledge. On appeal defendant contended that the ad-
mission of this evidence constituted reversible error on the
ground that guilty knowledge is not an element of the offense,
but that possession alone is sufficient to constitute the crime.
The statute defining the crime of unlawful possession of nar-
cotics contains no mention of guilty knowledge as an element
of the offense.2 The Supreme Court held, affirmed. Guilty knowl-
18. Id. at 81.
19. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1957 (1870), upon which the court relies to resolve any
doubt against the advertiser, would appear to announce a rule of interpretation
for completed contracts, and not one applicable to determining whether an offer
has been made. The article reads: "In a doubtful case the agreement is interpreted
against him who has contracted the obligation." (Emphasis added.)
20. See note 12 supra and the accompanying text.
1. LA. R.S. 40:962 (1950).
2. Ibid. : "It is unlawful for any person to manufacture, possess, have under his
control, sell, give, deliver, transport, prescribe, administer, dispense, or compound
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edge is an essential element of the crime of unlawful possession
of narcotics. "No crime can exist without the combination of a
criminal act and a criminal intent, or an evil motive, or with a
guilty knowledge of its consequences." 3 The opinion does not
disclose whether "guilty knowledge" is used to mean defendant's
knowledge that the substance is in his possession, or knowledge
not only of the presence of the substance, but also that the
substance is in fact a narcotic. State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317,
82 So.2d 24 (1955).
The degree of knowledge required to transform an act into
a crime depends upon the nature of the offense.4 In some crimes
knowledge of a particular fact is required.5 For example, to be
guilty of receiving stolen property a person must know or have
reason to believe that the property is in fact stolen.6 Conversely,
in some crimes generally known as civil offenses or public torts,
an act is made criminal without regard for the knowledge of
the actor. 7 Thus, in the offense of illegal sale of intoxicating
liquor, the offender is not required to know that the liquid sold
is an intoxicating liquor.8 When the criminal statute clearly
designates the mental element required, as is ordinarily the
case," the problem of determining the knowledge requirement
does not arise. When the statute is silent regarding the mental
element, however, as in the instant case involving the unlawful
possession of narcotics, the court must determine whether the
Legislature intended the act alone to constitute the crime, or
whether it intended knowledge of a particular fact to be an
element of the offense. At least two policy considerations in-
fluence the intention of the Legislature in this regard."' If proof
that an offender had knowledge of certain facts would be so dif-
ficult to establish that the effectiveness of the statute would be
seriously impaired, the Legislature is constrained to omit such
knowledge as an element of the offense." Further, if the pri-
any narcotic drug, except as provided in this Sub-part, or to be or become an addict
as defined in R.S. 40:961."
3. State v. Johnson, 228 La. 317, 334, 82 So.2d 24, 30 (1955).
4. Perkins, Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 11Mv. L. REV. 905, 917 (1939).
5. Ibid.
6. See LA. R.S. 14:69 (1950).
7. Perkins, Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARv. L. REV. 905, 917 (1939).
8. In the case of State v. Gardner, 198 La. 861, 5 So.2d 132 (1941), which is
factually similar to the instant case, the court indicated that knowledge is not an
element of the crime of illegally selling intoxicating liquors.
9. For example, articles of the Louisiana Criminal Code which require a gen-
eral criminal intent use the terms "intent" or "intentional."
10. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 73 (1933).
11. Mackey v. United States, 290 Fed. 18 (6th Cir. 1923).
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mary purpose of the statute is to benefit society rather than to
punish the individual offender, a requirement of guilty knowl-
edge has little relevance to the social evil the Legislature is
combatting. 1 2 In view of the social evils resulting from traffic
in narcotics and the extreme difficulty of proving that a pos-
sessor knows a substance to be a narcotic, legislatures which
enact statutes making the unauthorized possession of narcotics
a crime usually do not intend knowledge of the identity of the
substance to be an element of the offense.18 This has been the
interpretation the United States Supreme Court has given the
Federal Narcotics Act,' 4 and the interpretation given by state
courts of other jurisdictions to. statutes similar to the Louisiana
act.15
It is now settled in Louisiana that the crime of unlawful
possession of narcotics is not committed if the defendant was
ignorant of the presence of the substance found in his posses-
sion.1 6
If the broad language used by the court in the instant case
means that in addition to knowledge of the fact of possession1
7
the offender must also know that the substance is a narcotic,
the court would clearly be departing from the usual interpreta-
tions given such statutes. In view of the current trend of trans-
forming violations of narcotic statutes into major crimes by
the imposition of heavier penalties,' such a departure may be
justified. However, if this position is taken, requiring the
prosecution in every instance to prove that a possessor knows
12. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
13. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 CoLuM. L. REV. 55, 73 (1933).
14. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).
15. Interpreting the Uniform State Narcotic Law, a West Virginia court held
that an indictment for possession which omits the element of intent sufficiently
charges the offense. State v. Hinkle, 129 W.Va. 393, 41 S.E.2d 107 (1946). Like-
wise, a Texas court held that possession is unlawful unless it is one of the specific
types of possession authorized by the act. DeVine v. State, 206 S.WV.2d 247 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947).
16. The same day the Supreme Court decided the Johnson case, it also handed
down the decision in State v. Nicolosi, 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955), in which
the court squarely held knowledge of the fact of possession is an essential element
of the crime. Similarly, in Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921), the United
States Supreme Court indicated that a person must know that he possesses coun-
terfeiting dies in order to be guilty of illegal possession of those dies.
17. Even the most restricted interpretation of the language used in the Johnson
case would indicate that knowledge of the fact of possession is an essential element
of the crime.
18. LA. R.S. 40:981 (1950) provides, in part, that a person violating any pro-
visions of the act shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not less than two years
nor more than fifteen years.
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the identity of the substance, it would seriously impair the effec-
tiveness of the statute. The court could adopt a compromise posi-
tion by holding that proof of defendant's possession of a narcotic
drug would give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the de-
fendant knew the substance in question to be a narcotic. This
procedure has been successfully used by the Supreme Court of
the State of Washington, 19 and has the effect of largely pre-
serving the effectiveness of the statute in combatting traffic in
narcotics.
Albert L. Dietz, Jr.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - SHORT FORM INDICTMENT -
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Defendant was convicted under a bill of information which
charged that he did "unlawfully maliciously and feloniously com-
mit gambling as denounced by Louisiana Revised Statutes, Title
14, Section 90." Additional information concerning the precise
manner in which the crime had been committed was furnished
defendant in a bill of particulars. On appeal defendant contended
that the bill of information should have been quashed by the
trial court, as it did not properly inform him "of the nature and
cause of the accusation," as required by article I, section 10,
Louisiana Constitution of 1921.1 The Louisiana Supreme Court
held, reversed. 2 Section 1 of Act 223 of 1944,8 amending article
235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,4 insofar as it provides
that "it shall be sufficient to charge the defendant by using the
name and article number of the offense committed," is violative
of article I, Section 10, Louisiana Constitution of 1921. The na-
ture and cause of the offense must be fully stated in the initial
criminal charge, and the bill of particulars can in no way sup-
plement a deficient indictment or information. State v.
Straughan, 229 La. 1036, 87 So.2d 523 (1956).
19. State v. Wooten, 44 Wash.2d 177, 266 P.2d 342 (1954). The court in this
case applies this procedure in cases involving the crime of illegal sale of narcotics.
The same principle would apply, however, to unlawful possession of narcotics.
1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him...
2. Justices Hamiter, Hawthorne, and McCaleb dissenting.
3. La. Acts 1944, No. 223, § 1, p. 661; now LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950).
4. LA. R.S. 15:235 (1950). Article 235 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
sets forth a specific short form indictment for each of 22 of the more important
and recurring crimes.
[Vol. XVII
